We introduce a broad lattice manipulation technique for expressive cryptography, and use it to realize functional encryption for access structures from post-quantum hardness assumptions.
Introduction
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a very powerful notion of encryption, where ciphertexts are not decipherable according to the ownership of a specic key (as in public-key encryption), or a specic name (as in identity-based encryption), but according to the fulllment of a functional condition expressed as a predicate that takes multiple attributes as input.
Attribute-based encryption was rst realized in a paper by Goyal et al. [23] , although the idea was already present in the Fuzzy IBE of Sahai and Waters [34] , which for the rst time permitted ciphertexts to be addressed on the basis of a condition that was strictly richer than a mere equality (of keys or identities). Since then, the notion of ABE has blossomed into an entire research program known as Functional Encryption [24, 11] , whereby rich functions driven by inputs from both the ciphertext and the key attempting to decrypt it, determine whether the message, or some function thereof, can be accessed. As an illustrative example of recent developments in this area, Waters very recently built a functional cryptosystem whose predicates are deterministic nite automata [36] .
As impressive as these results may be, almost all of them appear to require the machinery of bilinear maps [29] which leaves them completely vulnerable to quantum cryptanalysis, by virtue of hinging on the classically hard but quantumly easy Discrete Log problem. (Limited instances of construction from yet other techniques [16, 10] do exist, but, with assumptions that hinge on Factoring, they are equally vulnerable to quantum attacks.) With quantum computers rapidly moving from a scientic to an engineering problem, it behooves us to have safe cryptographic alternatives ready before they become a realitypossibly with nary an advance warning. Lattices appear to be our best defense, for not only are they increasingly conjectured to thwart the quantum threat in a fundamental way, they also have a rich mathematical structure that makes them well suited for building complex and expressive cryptographic systems.
Lattices have made their apparition in cryptography with the work Ajtai [5] , and have since been used to construct a vast variety of primitives, including one-way and collision-resistant hash functions [5, 27] , signatures [12, 26] , public-key encryption [7, 32, 33] , identity-based encryption schemes [22, 15, 1, 2] , lossy trapdoor functions [31] , and even a couple instances of functional encryption for inner-product [4] and threshold [3] functions. Lattices have also been very instrumental in cracking the long-standing question of realizing fully homomorphic encryption [20, 21, 14] .
Lattices are indeed rapidly emerging as a mathematical platform of choice for building increasingly powerful and ecient cryptographic primitives. In addition to lattice problems being generally conjectured to withstand quantum attacks, the mathematical properties of these objects make them both relatively ecient and exible to enable the construction of powerful cryptosystems. Research in lattice-based cryptosystems that reduce from the Learning With Errors (LWE) hardness assumption has been particularly active, in no small part because the average-case LWE problem is itself reducible [33, 30] from a slew of worst-case lattice problems, for a sound foundation.
Despite all of those incentives and successes, the reality is that functional encryption so far remains largely conned to the world of bilinear maps. In recent years, only a handful of such systems have been successfully realized using lattices, such as the already cited constructions of IBE [22, 1] , HIBE [15, 2] , IPE [4] , and FuzzyIBE [3] . Further advances have remained elusive, despite the pull exerted by the faster pace of progress in that other world of bilinear maps.
Rather disconcertingly indeed, as attempts are made to translate high-level principles of bilinearmap functional encryption into lattice analogues, serious diculties tend to crop up in the most unexpected places when one tries to prove security. A pointed example, documented in [3] , relates to the unresolved diculties faced by those authors when trying to build ABE from LWE.
If anything, this brief history of functional encryption from lattices suggests that new ideas are in order for progress, beyond the eld's classic paradigms.
Main Motivations
Attribute-Based Encryption using Lattices is by many authors' account an important research question, having been posed and left unanswered in an number of recent works including [15, 1, 4, 3] .
Perhaps the best evidence of the problem's popularity is none other than a recent attempt by a large corporation to lay claim on its solution, in an eponymous patent application [17] , even though the problem explicitly remained open to this day.
1 Why such eager enthusiasm?
First and foremost, functional encryption in general and ABE in particular are extremely powerful cryptographic constructs that would seem almost incrediblee.g., by the standards of circa 2000 . FE and ABE primarily give us unprecedented exibility and expressiveness with which recipients can be designated in a wholesale manner. Not only do there exist direct use cases for such power (we refer to the early literature on the subject for examples), but the prospects that it opens for protocol building are highly intriguing.
As already alluded to, such rewards would be for naught if the looming threat of a catastrophic quantum cryptanalysis kept relegating it to where damage would be contained. It would be foolish to believe that because quantum registers have only grown from 5 to 7 qubits during the last decade, that their size could not suddenly become cryptographically devastating during the next one. This is where lattices come into play.
Compounding their conjectured quantum robustness, lattices also have a number of rather unique eciency and implementation advantages. For instance, while bilinear-map cryptosystems tend to be convenient to work with on paper thanks to the availability of clean abstractions, this view hides a rather complex elliptic-curve machinery that must be securely implemented in any physical implementation. In lattice-based cryptography, the situation is reversed: schemes and proofs tend to be more complex and mired in details, but implementations require only small-number arithmetic and basic linear algebra.
Those are the reasonsfrom quantum peace of mind, to the sheer challenge of solving compelling theory with practical applicationswhy it is far from wasted eort to reinvent Attibute-Based Encryption, not from bilinear maps but from lattices. (And as a bonus, we introduce a new technique whose power likely reaches into FE far beyond mere ABE.)
Our Contributions
Our main result is the construction of a functional encryption scheme for monotone access structures, also known as (key-policy) attribute-based encryption, and reduce its security from LWE. We achieve this result by way of a new lattice manipulation framework suited to the handling of complex access policies. Compared to earlier works on lattice-based IBE and FE, our framework has two distinguishing characteristics: the reliance on ephemeral lattices for all private-key extractions, and the subsequent application of a basis splicing technique which allows a recipient to convert an ephemeral lattice's basis into a basis for any lattice in a given family, as needed.
We introduce our framework in relation to a number of observations we make in our attempt to shed some light on the diculties previously faced. This leads us to a (rather informal) discussion of FE with uniform and non-uniform policies, and how the latter appeared hard to tackle based on previous lattice techniques.
Here we focus solely on introducing our framework and building key-policy KP-ABE from it.
We defer to future work the study of ciphertext-policy CP-ABE and even more ambitious FE.
1 The US patent application [17] appears to refer to a precursor of the Fuzzy IBE using Lattices subsequently published in [3] , wherein a superset of the authors explicitly acknolwedge that it did not extend to a proper ABE.
We further opine on mathematical but not legal grounds that our ABE falls outside of the claims of [17] .
Preliminaries
We refer to the Appendixavailable in the eprint version of the paper [13] for background on lattices in cryptography, and more specically on Ajtai lattices, Regev's public-key encryption and the LWE assumption, discrete Gaussian sampling, preimage sampling, lattice trapdoors, and notions of noise and variance associated with the sampling algorithms.
Attribute-Based Encryption
We follow the denition of the ABE functionality as given by Goyal et al. [23] , albeit for security we consider the notion of ciphertext privacy which implies both semantic security and recipient anonymity.
Denition 1 (Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption). A Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
This algorithm is input a security parameter λ and an attribute number . It outputs a public key Pub and a master key Msk.
Extract(Pub, Msk, Policy) → Key: This algorithm takes a public key Pub, a master key Msk, and an access policy Policy. It outputs a decryption key Key.
Linear Secret Sharing
Denition 3 (LSSS over Z q ). An LSSS Π over a set of parties P consists of an index map ρ and a share-generating matrix L ∈ Z ×θ q with rows and θ columns, where is the number of shares specied by Π, and θ depends on the structure of Π. For all i = 1, . . . , , the function ρ maps the i-th row of L to its corresponding party. The matrix L maps an input θ-vector v = (s, r 2 , . . . , r θ ), where s ∈ Z q is the secret to be shared, and r 2 , . . . , r θ ∈ Z q are random, into an output -vector L v = (s 1 , . . . , s ) containing the shares of the secret s according to Π. The share s i = (L v) i is assigned to party ρ(i).
Every LSSS according to the above denition enjoys the linear reconstruction property. This means that if Π is an LSSS for the access structure A, then the following is true. Let S ∈ A be any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } be dened as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exist constants {κ i ∈ Z q } for i ∈ I, such that, if the {λ i = (L v) i } are valid shares of any secret s according to Π, then i∈I κ i λ i = s. It was shown by Beimel [9] , that these constants {κ i } can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix L.
Vector Secrets and Reconstruction over Z. For the purpose of this paper, we will need a slightly modied notion of LSSS, where secrets and shares are -dimensional integer vectors in Z , and share-generating matrices are dened over Z rather than over Z q . This creates a few issues:
1. Since secrets and shares are themselves vectors, the vector v of all such shares should be viewed as a tensor, and the product (L · v) interpreted accordingly.
2. There is no notion of uniform share distribution over Z: a benign issue here.
3. Reconstruction in Z may require fractional interpolation coecients κ i ∈ Q. We alleviate this diculty by relaxing our notion of reconstruction, allowing the reconstructed vector to be a non-zero multiple of the original vector (which is non-trivial only if the vector has dimension greater than one). Such reconstruction is possible using only integer coecients κ i ∈ Z.
Low-Norm Share Generation. We will use the generic construction mechanism described in Appendix G of [25, eprint] to convert a monotone access structure into a deterministic LSSS matrix.
For access formulas with AND (∧) and OR (∨) gates only, it has the further advantage to build share-generating matrices L ∈ {0, ±1} ×θ with ternary elements in {0, ±1}. For such formulas, the (unrelaxed) reconstruction coecients κ i will be binary in {0, 1} by construction, even when working in Z, hence already integer and low-norm without further relaxation.
Duplicated Attributes. For ease of exposition, we rst restrict our attention to formulas where each attribute appears exactly once. Since ρ is then the identity function, we omit it from the notation altogetheruntil Section 4.5 and the Example Appendix of [13] where we handle missing and duplicated attributes.
Framework
Before delving into scheme details, it is useful to take a look at the idea behind the basis-splicing framework, and place it in its broader context.
Functional Encryption from Lattices
It all starts with Ajtai lattices, the Regev cryptosystem, and Gaussian sampling.
The Regev Cryptosystem. Recall that the Regev PKE scheme [33] makes use of an Ajtai lattice [5] , dened as Λ ⊥ q (A) = {x : A x = 0 (mod q)} ⊆ Z m , where q ∈ Z + and A ∈ Z n×m q together specify the lattice (though not necessarily in a unique way). In Regev's PKE scheme, one assumes q xed and m > n log q. The private key is a vector d ∈ Z m with low euclidean norm d q √ m. The public key is a pair (A, u) such that A d = u (mod q). To encrypt a bit m ∈ {0, 1}, one selects a random ephemeral vector s ∈ Z n q , and output a pair (c 0 , c 1 ), where c 0 = s u + q /2 m + ν 0 and c 1 = s A + ν 1 , and where the additive terms ν 0 and ν 1 are low-norm independent discrete gaussian noise terms. To decrypt, the private-key holder computes the dierence ∆ = c 0 − c 1 d in Z q , and interprets it as m = 1 if (the smallest non-negative representative of the coset) ∆ lies in { q /4 , 3 q /4 }, and as m = 0 otherwise.
Preimage Sampling. The Regev system has served as a starting point for many expressive functional generalizations of public-key cryptography. The key turning point in this generalization has been the development, in [22] , of a preimage sampling technique that, given A and u, allow one to obtain a preimage d such that A d = u (mod q) and such that d has the same conditional distribution given u as if it had been sampled rst and its image computed from it. What makes the preimage-sampling approach cryptographically interesting, is that in order to sample a preimage of good quality (where the quality of a sample is an inverse measure of its norm), it is (conjectured) necessary to possess a good quality or low-norm basis B for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (A). Furthermore, Ajtai's original result [5] does give us an ecient way to co-generate both a uniformly random matrix A and an associated short basis B for the lattice it induces; whereas it is a conjectured hard problem to nd even a single short vector after the fact for a given random A. Together, these methods provide an eective way to obtain provably secure trapdoors from lattice hardness assumptions, that have been used in interesting ways to construct increasingly expressive functional cryptosystems: IBE [22, 1] , HIBE [15, 2] , IPE [4] , FuzzyIBE [3] , and now ABE.
More Expressive Predicates. The combination of the lattice/basis co-generation algorithm of [5] , the basic public-key framework of [33] , and the preimage sampling approach of [22] , has led to the invention of several functional encryption schemes for various classes of functions, starting with the identity-based encryption scheme in the original paper [22] . A handful of other functional encryption schemes from lattices were later devised, including IBE in the standard model [15, 1] , hierarchical IBE [15, 2] , inner-product encryption [4] , and fuzzy IBE [3] . At a high level, all of those schemes nd their roots in the Regev PKE system, which they generalize in various ways following a common principle. The common principle is to extend Regev so that either or both the matrix A and/or the syndrome u depend on the functional decryption criterion, rather than being constant. In IBE, the decryption criterion is a match of identities, so we let A and/or u be function of the identity. In IPE and FuzzyIBE, the decryption criterion is an inner product equality or a threshold of equalities, obtained by splitting A and/or u into multiple shares A i and/or u i , each of which depending on one of the attributes of the decryption predicate.
Complex Policies and Non-Uniformity
In our quest to understand what dierentiates successes from failures in earlier lattice-based FE construction attempts, we are drawn to observe the emergence of a pattern that we shall attempt to characterize informally (based on inductive rather than deductive reasoning).
Uniform Policies. The successes share a crucial simplifying characteristic: all attributes taken as formal arguments in the decryption policy are of equal importance; they play symmetrical roles.
• IBE and HIBE use trivial examples of uniform policies, because the decryption predicate is a mere equality test that treats a full identity string as a single atomic input (of variable length in the case of HIBE), comparing that of the ciphertext with that of the private key.
• IPE uses uniform policies, because none of the multiple attributes taken as inputs to the decryption predicate, plays a dierent role or is more important than the others. Indeed, the predicate is of the form, k, c = 0 (mod q) ? (where k and c are the key's and the ciphertext's attribute vectors). Now let us consider a permutation π. If we apply it to the components of k and also to the components of c, one obtains the new predicate, π(k), π(c) = 0 (mod q) ?, which is in fact unchanged and evaluates to the same value.
• FuzzyIBE uses uniform policies by same reasoning. The only dierence is that here the predicate is a θ-out-of-threshold equality test between key and ciphertext attributes.
Non-Uniform Policies. To contrast, consider the following basic ABE decryption predicate:
It falls within the scope of the ABE model; yet it is nonuniform since the atomic clause that takes attribute A as input, (A k = A c ), can by itself truthify the entire predicate, whereas neither the clause in B nor in C can do the same. The attributes are not symmetrical, since A carries more weight than either B or C. Per our earlier criterion, some permutations π of the attributes would not leave the predicate invariant.
Leakage from Non-Uniformity. The authors of [3] observe that the diculty with extending existing lattice techniques into ABE stems from the conjunction of two risk factors: the necessity to prevent short-vector private keys from spilling a full basis; and the propensity of keys with asymmetrical components to do just that.
To be sure, there are examples of earlier FE successes that allow full-bases to be used as keys:
all the HIBE schemes [15, 1, 2] fall in that category, since full bases are needed for key delegation.
However, we contend that passing out full bases is not damaging in this case, because HIBE policies are trivially uniform, involving only a single attribute, so that either there is a full match or there is no match at allno need to nesse the power of the decryption key in any way.
The other past FE success with multi-vector keys is the FuzzyIBE from [3] . There, a private key is a Regev key randomly secret-shared into a number of vectors function of the thresholddenitely not a full basis which would give too much power. Such sharing nesse led to an attack when one attempted to extend the scheme to ABE with non-uniform policies, because of dicrepancies in the relative importance of the private key components. E.g., a key for A ∨ (B ∧ C) would be heavier at attribute A. In this situation, an adversary could, by making multiple key queries for related but distinct policies, obtain a collection of short vectors whose heavy coordinates together leak enough information to allow the adversary to reconstitute a rogue (sub-)basis. The uneven weight of the coordinates made it dicult to randomize the keys to prevent the heavy coordinates from leaking, without necessarily drowning the light coordinates in noise and render them useless.
Robust Embedding of Policies
Instead of trying to prevent the reconstitution of rogue bases from private-key vectors (which was the direction of future research envisioned in [3] ), we shall make our private keys into full bases outrightalbeit, bases of ephemeral random lattices that vary with every invocation of key extraction.
Ephemeral Lattices. Making keys from constantly changing, ephemeral lattices seems great for securitybut how can such keys be useful for decryption in a Regev-like system, if the lattices used for encryption and key extraction are dierent? In a nutshell, the ephemeral lattices (or, rather, the Ajtai matrices dening them) will have a known structure, featuring both deterministic and randomized subcomponents. The ephemeral lattice is rather high-dimensional and its structure will encode the private-key policy attributes. The structure will allow the recipient to transform this useless random-lattice basis, into a basis for any target lattice, typically of a lower dimension, that belongs in a certain authorized set that corresponds to the policy encoded into the initial structure.
Thus, if a private key is valid for a given ciphertext, meaning that the attributes of one satisfy the policy of the other, then the recipient is able to transform it into a basis for the lattice used in the ciphertext construction, and from there decryption à la Regev can proceed. Conversely, if a private key is invalid for a given ciphertext, the encryption lattice will be outside the authorized set, and the private key will be useless to derive a (short) basis for that lattice.
Basis Splicing. We refer as basis splicing the internal operations that let the recipient transform the given high-dimensional ephemeral-lattice basis, into a basis for any desired lower-dimensional lattice in the authorized set. In the case of ABE, the structure embedded in the ephemeral lattice will be obtained from an LSSS, and the basis splicing operations will amount to taking linear combinations of the basis vectors. Certain linear combinations will cause all the blinding randomness to vanish, transforming the initial unknown ephemeral lattice into a smaller known target lattice in the authorized set.
Security versus Functionality. At an intuitive level, the security benets that we derive from our approach are twofold:
• Private keys as full bases are more robust than single vectors. In a system where private keys are mere vectors, there is an incentive to obtain more than one such vector, in a bid to reconctruct a rogue basis. If the key is a full basis, there is nothing to be gained in trying to obtain another, which can be generated from the rst.
• Ephemeral lattices make a very potent blinding and rewalling mechanism. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the framework we propose: since the key-extraction mechanism involves an independently rerandomized lattice that changes upon each invocation, the private keys are in a very strong sense rewalled from one another and from the master secret.
These two properties should intuitively make it easy to construct a secure system, which should translate into easy-to-construct reductionist simulations. The main question then is to construct a scheme that can function under those parameters. This is where the basis-splicing mechanism comes into play, as we show next.
Scheme
As already noted, all references to the Appendix should redirect to the eprint version of this paper, available at [13] .
Intuition
Setup. The system setup is very straightforward. To each (binary) attribute Attrib i named in the system, is associated a random Ajtai matrix A i and a matching trapdoor B i such that A i B i = 0 for small B i . The matrices A i form the global public key. The trapdoors B i form the keying authority's master key.
In KP-ABE, ciphertexts are created for sets of (binary) attributes, while private keys embed the decryption policies. To make it possible to encrypt for a set of attributes, a natural idea is, for each (binary) attribute in the system, to create an Ajtai matrix A i and an associated trapdoor T i . The matrices A i will form the public key; the trapdoors T i form the master key.
Encryption. To encrypt for an attribute set {Attrib i }, one creates a matrix F by concatenating the public matrices A i designated by the Attrib i , lling the gaps with the zero matrix 0; one then uses F as an encryption matrix à la Regev. 2
Key Extraction. To create a private key for a given decryption policy represented as an LSSS, the key-extraction authority starts by constructing a (high
, where M diag is a block-diagonal assembly of all the A i , and M lsss is a tensor product of the LSSS matrix and a secret ephemeral randomization matrix. Using its knowledge of the masterkey bases B i , the authority creates a short basis W for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (M), randomizes it into a structure-less short basis K, and returns K as the private key. Notice that the basis K is that of a fresh random lattice whose dening Ajtai matrix M is not even revealed to the recipient.
Decryption. Given a Regev ciphertext created from some encryption matrix F, the rst step is to transform the private key K into a basis T for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (F), using the basis-splicing technique. The transformation requires the encryption matrix F to lie in the span of the (undisclosed!) ephemeral matrix M, i.e., that there be a linear combination of the rows of M that yields M → [F|0]. By the structure of M = [M diag |M lsss ], it follows that the i-th block-column of F is a multiple of the ith block of M diag , or, in other words, that F is the concatenation of g i A i with computable coecients g i . Though K was orthogonal to M, it is not orthogonal to [F|0] . We can obtain orthogonality to [F|0] by multiplying each row of K by an integer coecientḡ i ∝ 1/g i (mod q) inversely proportional modulo q to the coecient g i of the corresponding column of [F|0] (takingḡ i = 0 when corresponding to the columns of 0 or those of F associated with a coecient g i = 0).
The basis K thus transformed is a matrix [T |0 ] where T has full rank and is orthogonal to F. The nal observation is to takeḡ i = ( j:g j =0 g j )/g i . Because thoseḡ i are already in Z, no modular reduction is necessary to ensure thatḡ i ∝ 1/g i (mod q). Hence the norm T remains small when the g i are binary or small enough. This makes of T a low-norm full-rank set, convertible into a basis suitable as a trapdoor for sampling low-norm vectors in Λ ⊥ q (F). We see that, by properly constructing M, it is possible for the recipient to know how its trapdoor K can be transformed into the desired trapdoor T, even though M itself is not revealed. Once the 2 A Regev ciphertext (c0, c1) is created in reference to an Ajtai lattice Λ ⊥ q (F) dened by a known matrix F. We call the matrix F, the Regev encryption matrix. (It is usually denoted A but we use F to emphasize that it is a function of the encryption attributes; we reserve the notation Ai for the constant matrices in the public key.) trapdoor T is obtained, it can be used to decrypt the ciphertext, e.g., by nding a short preimage d of the encryption syndrome u, i.e., such that F d = u (mod q), and applying Regev. 3 Issues. For this approach to work, it is necessary that the norm of the reconstructed trapdoor T be small in order to apply Regev. The only operation that can cause the norm of T to grow out of hand, is the LSSS-based derivation of T from K. In general, for circuits containing proper threshold gatesnot just ∧ nor ∨with large fan-in, the coecients g i can become exponentially large, which would overwhelm the noise tolerance of the Regev decryption scheme unless the modulus q is itself chosen to be exponentially large.
The rst good news is that, even in the pessimal case, the issue of the LSSS coecients is somewhat mitigated by the fact that we only perform LSSS reconstruction half-way, eschewing full-edged Lagrange interpolation. Indeed, the worst way in which LSSS coecients intervene in T is through simple products j g j and not as ratios of products that would further require denominator elimination as, say, in the Fuzzy IBE of [3] . Intuitively, the reason why we do not need to account forand then eliminatethe common denominator in LSSS reconstruction, is because what needs to be reconstructed is not the secret decryption itself (such as a short pre image or basis), but merely a multiple of the (public) encryption matrix F; only a multiple is needed because F induces the same Ajtai lattice as all its multiples relatively prime to q.
The second and main good news is that, as long as the only gates present are ∧ and ∨, regardless of their size or circuit complexity, the coecients g i can be made binary ∈ {0, 1}, thereby ensuring that T ≤ K . This restriction is not as severe as it looks, as it should be emphasized that circuits of ∧ and ∨ gates already capture most cases of practical interest for (monotone) access policies.
Until now, it was not known how to realize ABE involving even the simplest non-uniform policies, e.g., involving only one ∧ and one ∨ gate.
Construction
We assume the existence of the following PPT algorithms for certain lattice sampling operations.
See the Appendix in [13] for some background, and the rapidly evolving literature for the fastest and tightest instantiations, e.g., [18] .
TrapGen for co-sampling a uniform Ajtai lattice and a short basis for it [5, 6] ; SampleGaussian for discrete Gaussian sampling a point on a given Ajtai lattice; SamplePreimage for sampling a preimage of a given Ajtai syndrome, with a discrete Gaussian conditional density [22, 8] . In the scheme description, we view all of the above sampling algorithms as (commodity, interchangeable) black boxes, without concern for their precise parameter requirements. For now, it suces to know that the available sampling algorithms are both suciently fast and suciently tight, to make the entire system security reducible from the learning-with-error (LWE) hardness assumption with polynomially bounded parameters, so that is can in turn be further (quantumly [33] , or for large moduli classically [30] ) reduced from worst-case lattice assumptions.
The KP-ABE scheme consists of four algorithms specied as follows.
3 Because the private key is a full basis, it allows the recipient to nd a preimage for any syndrome; hence the encryption syndrome u may change with each ciphertext. kpABE.Setup(1 λ , 1 ): Given a security parameter λ, and an attribute bound :
1. Select a security dimension n > Ω(λ) and a base lattice dimension m > 2 n log q, together with a prime modulus q > 2. (See the Appendix for the constraints on q in function of the desired tightness α of LWEthe larger the modulus, the weaker the assumption.)
2. Use algorithm TrapGen(1 λ ) to select, for each i ∈ [ ], a uniformly random n × m-matrix
with a full-rank m-vector set B i ⊆ Λ ⊥ q (A i ) that satises a low-norm condition. 3. Select a uniformly random n × m-matrix A 0 ∈ Z n×m q . 4. Select a uniform random n-vector u ∈ Z n q .
5. Output the public key and master key, 
Each row of L maps to a particular attribute according to the map ρ associated with the secret-sharing scheme. In this section, we are assuming for simplicity that each attribute (of index #i) appears exactly once (on the i-th row), making ρ the identity function.
This restriction is lifted in Section 4.5, to handle missing and duplicated attributes. 
Build a structureless random trapdoor
K for Λ ⊥ q (M), thus satisfying M · K = 0 (mod q).
. , B ).
Unless ExtendRight is already guaranteed to produce an extended basis W whose vectors are idenpendently and identically distributed, it is necessary to rerandomize it to achieve this condition. Let K be the resulting structureless trapdoor for M. 
Select a uniform random n-vector s ∈ Z n q .
3. Select a low-norm Gaussian noise scalar ν 0 ∈ Z according to some parametric distribution Ψ α (see Appendix), and compute the scalar,
Select a low-norm Gaussian noise vector ν 1 ∈ Z ( +1) m whose components are identically and independently distributed from Ψ α , and compute the vector,
(It is not necessary to transmit the components of c 1 that contain only added ν 1 -noise, i.e., we only need to transmit the components of c 1 at coordinates where F i = 0.) kpABE.Decrypt(Pub, Key, Ctx): Given a public key Pub, a policy-based key Key (for known policy Policy), and a ciphertext Ctx (for known attributes Attrib):
1. Find an as-short-as-feasible -vector g ∈ Z satisfying the two conditions:
Namely, one nds a linear combination of the rows of L that yields some small d-multiple of [1, 0, . . . , 0] with d ∈ Z \ {0}, using only rows corresponding to attributes in Attrib. This is possible i Attrib satises Policy.
2. Notionally apply the linear combination g to the block-rows of M, to transform the virtual encryption matrix M into a real encryption matrix M that matches the encryption matrix F of the given ciphertext (up to constant factors):
This is dened, even though the decryptor does not know the Z i , for they all cancel out.
3. Let M be the matrix containing only the |Attrib| + 1 non-zero block-columns of M as shown above. Let K be the matrix obtained by removing from K the matching rows and columnsi.e., rows and columns with the same indices as the columns removed from M .
(Dimension-wise, we obtain M ∈ Z n×(|Attrib|+1) m q and K ∈ Z (|Attrib|+1) m×(|Attrib|+1) m .) We have M · K = 0; therefore M · K = 0, and K is a short basis of Λ ⊥ q (M ). 4. Likewise, let F be the matrix retaining the |Attrib|+1 non-zero block-columns of F; and let c 1 be the ciphertext vector from which only the matching components of c 1 remain.
5
. We now build a trapdoor for the encryption matrix F, or, rather, its reduced form F . Let 1 be the m × m identity matrix, and dene the diagonal matrices,
The result T is our desired trapdoor for sampling short vectors in Λ ⊥ q (F ).
6. Using SamplePreimage with trapdoor T , nd a short solution f of F · f = u (mod q). 
Correctness
Theorem 4. For usual values of the lattice parameters in Regev-like encryption systems, the keypolicy attribute-based encryption scheme of the previous section will correctly decrypt authorized ciphertexts with overwhelming probability.
Proof. To see this, suppose that the independent initial bases and short vectors (namely, B i , Y i , e i,j , d i,j ) are sampled with a suitable Gaussian parameter σ, for instance using the tools from [22, 8] .
Then, the norm of all dependent bases and vectors that are supposed to be short, will be bounded by multiples of σ to which certain growth coecients will have applied. To bound those, we note that the only processes in the whole system that will induce growth, are:
• in Extract: the randomized invocation of ExtendRight to obtain K, which merely multiplies the norm of the master-key trapdoors by a constant factor independent of the data;
• in Decrypt: the calculation of the trapdoor T from K , which as we already noted multiplies the norm of K by a factor ≤ max{g i , d} that only depends on the linear-sharing reconstruction vector g, itself function of the function Policy and its inputs Attrib.
Bounding max{g i , d} for access-structure circuits with many gates can be tedious, but we note that max{g i , d} will be dominated by the presence of large threshold gates. On the contrary, ∧ and ∨ gates are essentially harmless, as shown below.
Claim. For a circuit consisting only of ∧ and ∨ gates, max{g i , d} = 1.
Proof. There exists a deterministic construction of a linear sharing matrix L that guarantees binary reconstruction coecients in this case (see Preliminaries).
We defer to the full paper the exact quantication of the various norm and noise parameters. Of course, while the growing norm of supposedly short vectors can be compensated by commensurately increasing the modulus q, this is best avoided for eciency reasons. Proof. In the LWE problem, the decision algorithm is given access to a sampling oracle, O, which is either a pseudo-random sampler O s with embedded secret s ∈ Z n q , or a truly random sampler O $ . Our decider algorithm B will simulate an attack environment for, and exploit the prowesses of A, to decide which oracle it is given. The reduction proceeds as follows.
Instance. B requests from O and obtains ((1 + ) m + 1) LWE samples that we denote as,
Target. A announces a target attribute vector, denoted Attrib † , on which it wishes to be challenged.
Setup. B constructs the public key Pub as follows:
1. The vector u ∈ Z n q is constructed from the LWE samples of index −1: simply set u = w. The resulting public key Pub is given to A.
Queries.
A is allowed to make adaptive queries for keys Key for policies Policy that the target attribute list Attrib † does not satisfy. B constructs and returns a key Key for each query Policy, as follows.
1. As in the real scheme, derive from Policy a (low-norm) linear sharing matrix L ∈ Z ×(1+θ) .
Make L from L by dropping the leftmost column of index j = 0 (keeping j = 1, . . . , θ).
3. W.l.o.g., suppose that Attrib † = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i φ } = {1, 2, . . . , φ}; i.e., the rst φ attributes, from 1 to φ, are arbitrarily assumed to be the attacker's targets.
4. W.l.o.g., suppose that the φ left-most columns of L form a φ-dimensional square matrix of full rank. The columns of L from which L is derived can always be reordered to achieve this, since the order of its columns (other than that of index j = 0) is arbitrary. Notice that this step requires that the challenge Attrib † do not satisfy the query Policy. 6. Build a virtual encryption matrix M exactly as in the real scheme (see below about the boxes), as, and Y i ∈ Z m×m such that Z i Y i = 0 (mod q). Suppose also that each Y i is a basis of Λ ⊥ q (Z i ) and has low norm Y i ≤ β ∈ R. Dene,
Then, for any full-rank integer matrix l i,j with i, j ∈ [φ], the Ajtai lattice induced by Z ∈ Z φn×φm q admits an eciently computable (in fact constant) trapdoor Y ∈ Z φm×φm i.e., such that Y is a basis of Λ ⊥ q (Z) with bounded norm Y ≤ β.
Proof. Take, 9. Randomize W into a structure-less basis K whose norm matches that of the real scheme.
(This step is only necessary if ExtendRight does not already produce a basis whose vectors all have the target discrete Gaussian distribution already; if they do, let K = W.)
This concludes the simulation of the private-key extraction. The adversary A is given the resulting Key = K, L . Notice that it has exactly the same distribution as in the real scheme.
Challenge. A signals that it is ready to accept a challenge, and chooses a message bit Msg † ∈ {0, 1}.
B responds with a ciphertext Ctx † = c † 0 , c † 1 assembled from the LWE instance, as follows:
Observe that when the v i come from a genuine LWE oracle, the foregoing is a well-formed Regev-like encryption of Msg † for the encryption matrix F indicated by the challenge Attrib † .
On the contrary, when the v i come from a random fake LWE oracle, the ciphertext is independent of the message bit since c † 0 in particular is uniformly and independently distributed.
Continuation.
A is allowed to continue making further private-key extraction queries, after having obtained the challenge ciphertext.
Decision. A eventually emits a guess, whether Ctx † was actually a valid encryption of Msg ∈ {0, 1} as requested. B uses the guess to decide whether the LWE oracle O was genuine. If A says valid, then B says genuine; if A says invalid, then B says fake.
If the adversary succeeds in guessing Msg † with probability at least 1 2 + , then our decision algorithm B will correctly guess the nature of the LWE oracle with probability at least 
Extensions
So far we have assumed, merely for simplicity of notation, that policies will only encode monotone access structures given as formulas where each attribute appears as argument exactly once. We now show how to list such limitations.
Duplicated Attributes
Arbitrary monotone policies will generally be expressed as formulas where various attributes appear zero, once, or even multiple times. Accordingly, we show how to handle policies that can comport arbitrarily many ∧ and ∨ gates, and an arbitrary wiring of the attribute inputs to feed them, including duplication. 4 The idea is very simple: kpABE.Setup' is unchanged from the original version: to each attribute one continues to associate one Ajtai matrix A i and its trapdoor B i . kpABE.Setup' also remains the same: the ciphertext is constructed as before, around a Regev encryption matrix F that either includes or excludes each submatrix A i depending on whether or not the respective attribute i ∈ Attrib.
kpABE.Extract' must be modied to allow for duplicate occurrences of the same attribute in the Boolean expression of Policy. This is done as follows:
1. Give each occurrence of some attribute #i in Policy a unique label, say #i.1 and #i.2, and accordingly rewrite the policy Policy into Policy as a function of the augmented attributes. Policy has the same topology (structure and size) as Policy, but its input literals are now unique. Keep track of the mapping from the augmented attributes i to the original attributes i by means of a surjective map ρ : i → i.
2. Construct the sharing matrix L in the regular way from the augmented-attribute formula Policy . For each original attribute #i, there will be as many rows in L as the number of occurrences of #i in the original Policy.
3. Construct the virtual encryption matrix M from L as before. Since the augmented attributes that emanate from the same original attribute, all refer to the same public matrix A i , the key-extraction matrix M will thus contain multiple copies of A i , albeit on dierent columns.
Once M has been constructed with possibly duplicated A i on its left-side block-diagonal, key extraction both in the real scheme and in the simulation will proceed as usual. The only eect of the duplication is that, in the simulation, knowledge of trapdoors B i will be linked to the presence of the original attributesnot the augmented onesin Attrib † .
kpABE.Decrypt' requires a small adjustment to cope with duplicated attributes in the Policy encoded in the decryption key. Essentially, before applying the decryption algorithm, the decryptor needs to avail himself as many copies of the attribute as he will need. This is done by duplicating the various fragments of c 1 that correspond to the attributes that need to be duplicated, before using the result in the normal decryption process.
4 We must however continue to caution on the use of t-out-of-n threshold gates ≥t, because unless t = 1 or t = n we cannot guarantee in general that the LSSS matrix L and the reconstruction coecients will be small. Fortunately, as long as repeated attribute inputs are allowed, every possible monotone access structure can be expressed using only ∨ and ∧ gates, in such a way that L is a binary or ternary matrix.
This construction is very ecient as the ciphertext size remains unchanged in |Attrib|, and the private key size has the same dependency on |Policy| as it did without attribute duplication (of course, |Policy| can now grow arbitrarily).
Negated Attributes
Handling negation is more complex. One approach is to pair each attribute with its logic opposite, and let ciphertexts and policies be expressed as functions of the positive and negative literals.
However, this does not quite yet capture the richness of formulas that allow an unrestricted use of ¬-gates, in addition to ∨-gates and ∧-gates
One possibility is to generalize the positive/negative dual representation trick at every level of the formula tree, ensuring that to every node is associated two values that are the logical complement of each other.
This is all we are going to say about this topic. We leave it as an open problem the task of properly extending our scheme to handle negation in an ecient way.
Elimination of A 0
The astute reader will observe that the public matrix A 0 never uses any trapdoor, in either the scheme or the proof.
A 0 is not essential, and can be eliminated if we move, in Extract's construction of M, the LSSS coecients l i,0 from A 0 to the A i . Some care must then be taken with the application of ExtendRight, since the left-hand block-diagonal part of M may no longer have full rank, but this can be handled.
Aside from making the keys and ciphertexts marginally smaller, the main benet of eliminating A 0 is to remove the coecient d from the expression of G in the Decrypt algorithm, thus possibly lowering the norm of the reconstructed decryption trapdoor T in the general case where threshold gates are present. (The norm of T is never an issue if only ∨ and ∧ gates are present.) 5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new cryptographic framework for performing complex lattice basis manipulations, of the kind that seemingly can unlock the construction of very powerful and expressive cryptosystems such as functional encryption. We demonstrated its power and exibility by building the rst known attribute-based cryptosystem from learning with errors, a (conjectured) quantum-resistant hardness assumption tied to many lattice problems.
A Background
In this Appendix we provide some abbreviated background information on lattice denitions and a few important results to be used in this paper. This also serves to x the notation.
A.1 Random Integer Lattices
Throughout the paper, we let the parameters q = q(λ), m = m(λ), n = n(λ) are polynomial functions of the security parameter λ. TrapGen(n, m, q, σ) [22] : On input a modulus q, a lattice dimension m, a constraint dimension n, and a Gaussian deviation parameter σ dimension Λ, it outputs A and T as above.
A.3.1 Sampling Discrete Gaussians over Lattices
Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [22] construct the following algorithm for sampling from the discrete Gaussian D Λ,σ,c , given a basis B for the m-dimensional lattice Λ with σ ≥ B · ω(
Proposition 11 ([22] ). There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, on input an arbitrary basis B of an m-dimensional full-rank lattice Λ = L(B), a parameter σ ≥ B ·ω( √ log m), and a center c ∈ R m , outputs a sample from a distribution that is statistically close to D Λ,σ,c . For concreteness, we will refer to the algorithm of Proposition 11 as follows:
SampleGaussian(Λ, B, σ, c) [22] : On input lattice Λ, a basis B for Λ, a positive Gaussian parameter σ, and a center vector c ∈ R m , it outputs a fresh random vector x ∈ Λ drawn from a distribution statistically close to D Λ,σ,c .
A.4 Preimage Sampling
The main use of short lattice basis for our purposes, is that they will allow us to sample short preimages of a specic target under the linear map dened by the matrix associated with the lattice. The following algorithm from [22] is what allows us to perform this preimage sampling. The shorter the lattice basis, the smaller a preimage we shall be able to obtain. 
SamplePreimage(A,
T
A.5 Hardness Assumption
The LWE (learning with errors) problem was rst dened by [33] , and has since been extensively studied and used. We use the decisional version of the LWE problem.
Denition 12. Consider a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution χ over Z q , all public.
An (Z q , n, χ)-LWE problem instance consists of access to an unspecied challenge oracle O, being, either, a noisy pseudo-random sampler O s carrying some constant random secret key s ∈ Z n q , or, a truly random sampler O $ , whose behaviors are respectively as follows:
O s : outputs noisy pseudo-random samples of the form (w i , v i ) = w i , w T i s+x i ∈ Z n q ×Z q , where, s ∈ Z n q is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key that is invariant across invocations, x i ∈ Z q is a freshly generated ephemeral additive noise component with distribution χ, and w i ∈ Z n q is a fresh uniformly distributed vector revealed as part of the output.
O $ : outputs truly random samples w i , v i ∈ Z n q × Z q , drawn independently uniformly at random in the entire domain Z n q × Z q .
The (Z q , n, χ)-LWE problem statement, or LWE for short, allows an unspecied number of queries to be made to the challenge oracle O, with no stated prior bound. We say that an algorithm A decides the (Z q , n, χ)-
It has been shown in [33] that there is a poly(n, q)-time reduction from Search LWE(Z q , n, χ) to Decision LWE(Z q , n, χ).
The condence in the hardness of the LWE problem stems in part from a result of Regev [33] which shows that the for certain noise distributions χ, the LWE problem is as hard as the worst-case SIVP and GapSVP under a quantum reduction (see also [30] ). A classical reduction with related parameters was later obtained by Peikert [30] .
Proposition 13 ([33] ). Consider a real parameter α = α(n) ∈ (0, 1) and a prime q = q(n) > 2 √ n/α. Denote by T = R/Z the group of reals [0, 1) with addition modulo 1. Denote by Ψ α the distribution over T of a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation α/ √ 2 π then reduced modulo 1. Denote by x = x + 1 2 the nearest integer to the real x ∈ R. Denote byΨ α the discrete distribution over Z q of the random variable q X mod q where the random variable X ∈ T has distribution Ψ α .
Then, if there exists an ecient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the (Z q , n,Ψ α )-LWE problem, there exists a quantum q·poly(n)-time algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems, to withinÕ(n/α) factors in the 2 norm, in the worst case.
Since the best known algorithms for 2 k -approximations of gapSVP and SIVP run in time 2 O(n/k) ) [19, 35, 28] , it follows from the above that the LWE problem with the noise ratio α = 2 −n is likely hard for some constant < 1.
B Example
Nothing like a small example could possibly illustrate better the workings of our KP-ABE scheme, and, by generalization, the fundamental principle behind the new framework that we propose for this kind of constructions.
Extraction. Consider the monotone access structure given by the Boolean expression,
Of course Policy can be reduced into the simpler expression A ∧ (B ∨ C), but the above expression has a duplicate attribute which will let us illustrate how that works. To construct the corresponding private key, we rst rewrite the policy in function of uniquely appearing augmented attributes:
where the superscripts specify the arbitrary indices of the augmented attributes that together form the domain of the map ρ. We then translate Policy' into a sharing matrix, using some simple deterministic translation rule that for ∨-&-∧ formulas guarantees a binary output: Starting from L we assemble the virtual encryption matrix M which here takes the form,
where we observe that the public matrix A A appears twice on the left diagonal, because there were two occurrences of the attribute A in the access structure formula Policy. From there, knowing a trapdoor for each of the A i on the left diagonal, we can construct our policy-encoding private key K as a (randomized) short basis for the lattice induced by M. The private key hides the structure of M and especially the ephemeral and undisclosed submatrices Z i from the recipient.
As mentioned before, only the upper-left quadrant K of K is useful; the rest may be omitted. We emphasize that since encryption is with reference to a list of attributes, there is no notion of duplication here.
Decryption. To decrypt Ctx using Key, the rst step is to nd a linear combination of the rows of L that allows reconstruction of the target vector. Here, the winning combination is a ternary 5 vector g, where, target where we note not only that g assigns non-zero coecients exclusively to augmented attributes corresponding to the attributes A and C that are true in the ciphertext, but also that, of the two augmented attributes A (1) and A (3) linked to A, one has value 1 and the other 0.
This is consistent with the rules of secret-sharing reconstruction with duplicated attributes, which require only that all false attributes be given coecient zero. Next, per the Decrypt algorithm, we construct a real encryption matrix M using the coecients from g and d, M = 0 0 A A −A C | A 0 0 0 and we know that this matrix M can be expressed from the virtual encryption matrix M (for which K is a short basis and K an excerpt of same) by the tensor linear combination,
The Decrypt algorithm shows how to transform the key K into a trapdoor for the matrix M (or precisely for the matrix F reconstructed from M to match the true encryption matrix F).
Here, the transformation is as follows:
The last step, in order to perform Regev decryption using a short preimage d of u sampled using this trapdoor T , is to have a matching ciphertext, i.e., a ciphertext (that appears to have been) built upon the real encryption matrix M (or, rather, its pruned version, the aforementioned F ). Since some attributes were duplicated in the matrix M (or F ), we need to perform a similar duplication of the corresponding ciphertext fragments, and transform, so that the width of c 1 matches that of M to ensure that Regev decryption can proceed. Decryption proper works rst by using the trapdoor T to sample a preimage d of u under M (or F ), and then by taking the inner product of said d with c 1 and subtracting the result (consisting of blinding plus noise) from c 0 to reveal (a noisy version of ) q 2 Msg (mod q). Remark. The formal description of the scheme provides that the superuous rows and columns of F , T , c 1 , etc.i.e., such rows and columns that become multiplied by zero, be suppressed for eciency. We preserved them in this illustration for the sake of exposition.
LSSS. To x ideas, it is also useful to see a few other examples of explicit encodings of policies into sharing matrices. The following examples illustrate, with one exception, cases of formulas that consists only of ∨-gates and ∧-gates with no non-trivial threshold gates. In that case, regardless of input duplication, it is always possible to have binary sharing matrices, i.e., with entries in {0, 1}, that allow ternary reconstruction vectors, i.e., with coecients in {0, ±1}. 
